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On September 28, 2018, Palestine lodged a complaint at the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) against the United States, arguing that the latter’s shift-
ing of its Israeli embassy to Jerusalem violates the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations (VCDR)1 and it should be shifted.2 This article seeks to 
address the legal issues that may arise before the ICJ in this case. This article, 
not being an amicus curiae brief or advocacy piece, seeks to engage in aca-
demic discourse on the issues and not argue for or against the case of the dis-
puting parties. While this is an issue where realpolitik may well be intrinsi-
cally connected with the law, the former is by no means the focus of the article 
and is only looked into when otherwise inevitable. 
President Trump’s decision to move the embassy aligns him with the po-
sition taken by U.S. Congress with the passing of Jerusalem Embassy Act in 
1995 (EA).3 However, although the EA required the U.S. executive branch to 
shift the embassy to Jerusalem, it provided the President with an option to 
seek a waiver, which presidents preceding President Trump persistently 
availed.4 The prior presidents also argued the power of recognition is a purely 
executive matter, an argument that the U.S. Supreme Court accepted in Zivo-
tofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky).5 President Trump, however, opted to deviate from 
the position of his predecessors and finally moved the U.S. embassy to Jeru-
salem on May 14, 2018.6 
This relocation is critical for Palestine because if other states follow the 
U.S.’s decision to relocate, it could gradually lead to an international 
 
 1 See generally, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. 
 2 Press Release, I.C.J., The State of Palestine Institutes Proceedings against the United 
States of America, I.C.J. Press Release No. 2018/47 (Sept. 28, 2018). 
 3 Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-45, Nov. 8, 1995, 109 Stat. 398. 
 4 Stephen Farrell, Why is the U.S. Moving its Embassy to Jerusalem?, REUTERS (May 
7, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-israel-diplomacy-jerusalem-explai/why- 
is-the-u-s-moving-its-embassy-to-jerusalem-idUSKBN1I811N. 
 5 Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2081 (2015). Zivotofsky, who was born in Je-
rusalem, wanted to have his place of birth on his passport to be Israel. As the executive 
branch did not recognize any country’s sovereignty over Jerusalem, his birthplace on his 
passport was listed as “Jerusalem.” The Court determined that by passing the Foreign Re-
lations Authorization Act in 2002, which entitled persons born in Jerusalem to have Israel 
listed as their place of birth, Congress usurped the President’s executive power to recognize 
foreign states. 
 6 Alexandra Ma, Trump Has Officially Moved the US Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem—
and More than 58 Palestinians Are Dead in Protests, BUS. INSIDER (May 14, 2018), https:// 
www.businessinsider.com/us-embassy-officially-moves-to-jerusalem-palestinians-die-in-
protests-2018-5. 
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recognition that undivided Jerusalem falls within Israel’s territories.7 This 
may undermine Palestine’s effort to establish a state in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital, which Palestine has sought to 
do consistently for quite some time.8 This prospect holds despite a disclaimer 
in the declaration by President Trump in December 2017, stating that the 
“United States continues to take no position on any final status issues. The 
specific boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem are subject to final sta-
tus negotiations between the parties. The United States is not taking a position 
on boundaries or borders.”9 This move by President Trump is also a clear re-
versal from the former position of the United States, as evident from the U.S. 
Secretary of State’s position quoted in the D.C. Circuit’s judgment in Zivo-
tofsky that: 
Any unilateral action by the United States that would signal, 
symbolically or concretely, that it recognizes that Jerusalem is 
a city that is located within the sovereign territory of Israel 
would critically compromise the ability of the United States to 
work with Israelis, Palestinians and others in the region to fur-
ther the peace process.10 
As I noted last year, President Trump’s “decision to relocate the U.S. em-
bassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem is an unequivocal recognition of Israel’s 
claim to the united city of Jerusalem.”11 In addition, I noted that “to imply that 
by doing this, the U[.]S[.] has not taken any decision on boundaries or bor-
ders” seems unpersuasive.12 The discussion that follows first chronicles the 
procedural developments in the case so far. It then surmises the legal effect of 
potential non-appearance of the United States in this case, the locus standi of 
Palestine for filing this case, the compliance of United States’ action with the 
VCDR, the issue of the case of affecting the rights of a third party (Israel), 
and the justiciability of political questions by the ICJ. The article concludes 
by arguing that while Palestine’s case is likely to face some substantial hurdles 
 
 7 Md. Rizwanul Islam, Palestine Objects to US Embassy Move at ICJ, BANGKOK POST 
(Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1553566/palestine-objects- 
to-us-embassy-move-at-icj. 
 8 Id. See also Press Release, General Assembly, As General Assembly Debates 
Question of Palestine, Members Call for Swift Action to Jump-Start Israeli-Pales-
tinian Talks, Realize Two-State Solution, U.N. Press Release GA/12095 (Nov. 29, 
2018). 
 9 Pres. Proc. No. 9683, 82 Fed. Reg. 58331 (Dec. 11, 2017). 
 10 Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 725 F.3d 197, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 11 Islam, supra note 7. 
 12 Id. 
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at a procedural level, the case seems to be a persuasive one at a substantive 
level. 
II. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS 
On a procedural level, it is important to note that in a letter communicated 
to the Registry of the ICJ, the United States indicated a belief that it does not 
stand in a treaty relationship with Palestine with regard to either the VCDR or 
its Optional Protocol (OP).13 On October 3, 2018, the United States also with-
drew from the OP.14 For these reasons, the United States requested the ICJ to 
take the case off its Registry.15 Palestine, on the other hand, asked that the 
Court decide the issues of jurisdiction and of merit together.16 The ICJ decided 
that it would first decide on the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility 
of the application.17 The jurisdiction of the ICJ is decided on the basis of the 
date when the Court is seised of the matter and events subsequent to that 
would have no effect on jurisdiction of the Court unless “events occurring 
subsequent to the filing of an application may render the application without 
object such that the Court is not called upon to give a decision . . . .”18 This 
would be so even if the matter arguably becomes factually moot as the Court 
decided in Congo v Belgium.19 In that case, Belgian parliament implemented 
law of universal jurisdiction and subsequently, Belgium issued an arrest war-
rant against Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo for racially hateful speech.20 Congo 
alleged that this was a violation of customary international law of immuni-
ties.21 When the case was decided, Yeorida held no ministerial position and 
thus, Belgium argued that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction because the matter had 
become moot.22 However, the ICJ rejected this claim, as the Court found that 
since Congo alleged the invalidity of the warrant of arrest and Belgium 
 
 13 Relocation of the United States Embassy to Jerusalem (Palestine v. U.S.), Order, ICJ 
General List No. 176 (Nov. 15) [hereinafter Order of November 15]. See generally Op-
tional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compul-
sory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 487. 
 14 Raberta Rampton, Lesley Wroughton, & Stephanie van den Berg, U.S. Withdraws 
from International Accords, Says U.N. World Court ‘Politicized’, REUTERS, (Oct. 3, 2018), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-diplomacy-treaty-idUSKCN1MD2CP. 
 15 Order of November 15, supra note 13. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 
Rep. 3 (Feb. 14), at ¶ 32. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at ¶¶ 13-15. 
 21 Id. at ¶ 21. 
 22 Id. at ¶ 18. 
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defended it, the object of the dispute subsisted, despite factual changes in the 
events.23 Thus, it may be argued that had the ICJ possessed jurisdiction in the 
matter before the United States’ withdrawal from the OP, it would continue 
to possess the jurisdiction notwithstanding the withdrawal. 
The ICJ fixed May 15, 2019 as the deadline for Palestine to submit its 
memorial and November 15, 2019 as the deadline for the United States to 
submit its counter-memorial.24 Given the United States’ assertion denying the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ and non-appointment of an agent before the Court’s 
order on November 15, 2018, it is unclear as to whether the United States 
would submit a counter-memorial and take part in further proceedings of the 
Court at all. Since the Palestinians exchanged a note verbale on July 4, 2018 
with the U.S. Department of State about this matter,25 it is a little curious why 
the United States did not withdraw from the OP before the filing of the Pales-
tinian Case at the ICJ. A plausible explanation for this is that the U.S. govern-
ment did not foresee Palestine bringing a case to the ICJ about this. 
III. THE EFFECT OF POTENTIAL NON-APPEARANCE OF THE USA 
The consequence of non-appearance before the ICJ is addressed in Article 
53(1) of the ICJ Statute.26 This provides when a party to a dispute before it 
does not appear or defend its case, the other party may petition that the Court 
decides the case in its favor.27 However, it is incumbent on the Court that 
before it does so, it is satisfied that there is ICJ jurisdiction over the matter 
and that the case is well-founded in fact and law.28 Thus, Article 53 protects 
the non-appearing party from unfounded claims upheld against it, which dif-
fers from many municipal legal systems where the courts may pass default 
judgement relatively easily against a non-appearing party.29 
As a matter of law, even though the United States has not yet appeared 
before the ICJ, for jurisdiction purposes, the United States has become a party 
to the case and the ICJ may proceed to decide it. The support for this propo-
sition may be found in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case30 observing: 
 
 23 Id. at ¶ 32. 
 24 Order of November 15, supra note 13. 
 25 Relocation of the United States Embassy to Jerusalem (Palestine v. U.S.), Application 
Instituting Proceedings, General List No. 176, ¶ 35, (Sept. 28) [hereinafter Palestine Insti-
tuting Proceedings]. 
 26 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 53(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 
33 U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at art. 53(2). 
 29 See infra note 39 and the accompanying text. 
 30 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (July 25) 
[hereinafter Fisheries Jurisdiction]. 
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It is to be regretted that the Government of Iceland has failed 
to appear in order to plead its objections . . . . The Court how-
ever, as an international judicial organ, is deemed to take judi-
cial notice of international law, and is therefore required in a 
case falling under Article 53 of the Statute, as in any other 
case, . . . to consider on its own initiative all rules of interna-
tional law which may be relevant to the settlement of the dis-
pute. It being the duty of the Court itself to ascertain and apply 
the relevant law in the given circumstances of the case, the 
burden of establishing or proving rules of international law 
cannot be imposed upon any of the parties, for the law lies 
within the judicial knowledge of the Court.31 
In a similar vein, in the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran, when Iran did not appear at the ICJ to defend the case brought against 
it by the United States, the Court regretted the former’s lack of presentation 
but felt that by dint of the settled jurisprudence, it had to apply Article 53 of 
the Statute and decide propiro motu the question of admissibility of the appli-
cation and the question of jurisdiction on the basis of materials before it.32 In 
doing this, the Court, inter alia, assessed the letters communicated to it by Iran 
to deny jurisdiction.33 When a party does not appear, the appearing party may 
enjoy somewhat greater leeway in establishing the facts claimed by it.34 This 
is natural because in some way the voice of the non-appearing party would be 
missing in the Court. In Corfu Channel, the Court took the view that when a 
party does not appear, the Court is under a duty to assess whether or not the 
 
 31 Id. at ¶17. 
 32 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 
I.C.J. Rep. 18, ¶ 33 (May 24) [hereinafter Diplomatic Staff in Tehran]. 
 33 Id. 
 34 The following paragraph of the dissenting opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings in 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 
1986 I.C.J. 528, 544 (June 27), eloquently explaining the point: 
One is bound to observe that here, where questions of fact may be every 
bit as important as the law, the United States can hardly complain at the 
inevitable consequences of its failure to plead during the substantive 
phase of the case. It is true that a great volume of material about the facts 
was provided to the Court by the United States during the earlier phases 
of the case. Yet a party which fails at the material stage to appear and 
expound and explain even the material that it has already provided, inev-
itably prejudices the appreciation and assessment of the facts of the case. 
There are limits to what the Court can do, in accordance with Article 53 
of the Statute, to satisfy itself about a non-appearing party’s case; and 
that is especially so where the facts are crucial. 
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case filed is well-founded.35 However, the duty obliges the Court to assess 
their accuracy in all details. Underscoring the impracticability of such rigor-
ous scrutiny in some situations, the ICJ decided “[i]t is sufficient for the Court 
to convince itself by such methods as it considers suitable that the submissions 
are well founded.”36 
The above, of course, does not mean that the Court is only limited to the 
materials presented to it by the appearing party and any communication pre-
sented by the non-appearing party. The Court may, for instance, rely on mat-
ters of public knowledge as it did in Diplomatic Staff in Tehran.37 The Court 
may also appoint external experts as it did in Corfu Channel.38 However, in 
relying on these sources, the Court has to be cognizant that it does not some-
how end up doing what the absent party had to. The ICJ explained in Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua Case) that 
“[t]he intention of Article 53 was that in a case of non-appearance neither 
party should be placed at a disadvantage; therefore the party which declines 
to appear cannot be permitted to profit from its absence . . . .”39  While there 
are no specific rules ensuring this, the ICJ in Nicaragua Case simply asserted 
that “[t]he treatment to be given by the Court to communications or material 
emanating from the absent party must be determined by the weight to be given 
to these different considerations.”40 Thus, we are left no wiser on what the 
different considerations could be in a particular case. However, in all cases, 
the Court is required to determine and apply the relevant rules of international 
law, and this is all the more important when one of the parties would not ap-
pear before it.41 
International law is still based on the consent of states. Starting with the 
Hague Peace Conferences and the Covenant of the League of Nations and 
further bolstered by the Briand Kellogg Pact of 1928, there has been a growing 
leaning toward peaceful settlement of international disputes.42 Thus, as a mat-
ter of policy, it may be submitted that states should appear before the ICJ to 
promote a peaceful resolution of international disputes. The same view is also 
consonant with the U.N. Charter and ICJ Statute both of which speak of 
 
 35 The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 244, 248 (Dec. 15) 
[hereinafter Corfu Channel]. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Diplomatic Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. Rep at ¶ 12-13. 
 38 Corfu Chanel, 1949 I.C.J. at 247. 
 39 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judg-
ment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 31 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case]. 
 40 Id. 
 41 U.K. v. Ice., 1974 I.C.J. at 9. 
 42 General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 
1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57. 
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peaceful settlement of international disputes.43 At another level, some eco-
nomically powerful states advocate for greater recourse to international courts 
and tribunals in economic matters such as trade and investment.44 At the same 
time, they are sometimes recalcitrant to appear in the international courts and 
tribunals in matters in which they do not any have strong economic or strategic 
incentives to do so45 is somewhat hypocritical. A principled approach to in-
ternational law would demand that economically strong states would have a 
uniform approach in embracing dispute settlement in all areas of international 
law, not just in areas where they believe that their economic imperatives suits 
resorting to international law. 
In light of Article 94 of the U.N. Charter and Articles 59 and 60 of the ICJ 
Statute, it is likely that if the ICJ eventually finds jurisdiction and renders a 
judgment in favor of Palestine, the United States would likely be bound by 
such judgment. However, the judgment’s practical value would be meaning-
less because, pursuant to Article 94 of the U.N. Charter, the US, as a member 
of the U.N. Security Council, can veto down any measure against it.46 In any 
event, the Security Council has yet to enforce a judgment by the ICJ.47 That, 
of course, in no way diminishes the jurisprudential or moral value of the 
Court’s judgments. 
IV. IS PALESTINE A STATE OR CAN IT BE A PARTY BEFORE THE ICJ? 
Article 34 of the ICJ Statute states that “[o]nly states may be parties in 
cases before the Court.”48 Thus, an obviously thorny issue for Palestine to get 
this case settled by the ICJ may be to prove that it is a state. It is likely that 
the United States would argue that Palestine merely has an observer status in 
the United Nations49 and is not yet a state,50 and hence, Palestine does not 
 
 43 U.N. Charter arts. 38, 52; ICJ Statute art. 4. 
 44 See generally Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Proposals for Strengthening the UN Dispute 
Settlement System–Lessons from International Economic Law, 3 MAX PLANCK 
YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW (1999). 
 45 Id. 
 46 U.N. Charter art. 94. 
 47 Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 822 (2007). 
 48 ICJ Statute art. 34. 
 49 Initially, in 1974 it was the Palestine Liberation Organization which was granted the 
observer status and it was in 1988 that the U.N. General Assembly changed this to Pales-
tine. See G.A. Res. 43/177 (Dec. 15, 1988). In 1998, the status of Palestine was somewhat 
upgraded; it was allowed to take part in the U.N. but not to vote. See G.A. Res. 52/250 
(July 7, 1998). 
 50 John Bolton, the former U.S. National Security Advisor, has been quoted saying that 
the “so-called state of Palestine’s move to the ICJ would be blocked.” See Dierdre 
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qualify as a party before the ICJ. There is a scholarly opinion that the observer 
status is not even a springboard to gain eventual statehood.51 On this point, 
Palestine’s argument could be based on the non-member observer state status 
granted by the U.N. General Assembly through its Resolution 67/19 of No-
vember 29, 2012.52 The counterargument to giving a definitive emphasis on 
this Resolution would be that it is not the United Nations, rather individual 
states who recognize states.53 
And if the Court takes the constitutive theory of recognition,54 then the 
status of this Resolution could be somewhat diminished. However, in the con-
temporary era, the recognition of states is generally considered declaratory.55 
Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 
did not mention recognition as one of the elements of statehood.56 Article 6 of 
the Convention has categorically proclaimed “[t]he recognition of a state 
merely signifies that the state which recognizes it accepts the personality of 
the other with all the rights and duties determined by international law.”57 In 
three of its ten opinions, the Commission set up by the European Economic 
Community to arbitrate the orderly dissolution of Yugoslavia also took the 
view that the recognition of states is only declaratory.58 However, it is 
 
Shesgreen, Bolton Says U.S. Will Block Legal Challenge from So-Called State of Palestine’ 
over Embassy Move, USA TODAY (Oct. 3, 2018), www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/20 
18/10/03/bolton-blasts-legal-challenge-so-called-state-palestine/1513340002/. For a de-
tailed analysis on the issue of Palestine’s statehood from a general international law point 
of view see, e.g., Francis A. Boyle, The Creation of the State of Palestine, 1:1 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 301 (1990); JOHN QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD OF PALESTINE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 2010); cf. James Crawford, 
Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon? 1:1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 307 (1990). 
 51 See, e.g., JAMES. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 195 
(Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 2d ed. 2006). 
 52 G.A. Res. 67/19, ¶ 2 (Nov. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Resolution]. 
 53 SIMON CHESTERMAN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATION: DOCUMENTS 
AND COMMENTARY 205 (2d ed. 2016). 
 54 The proponents of this theory argue that it is only through recognition of a new state 
by other states that a new state may gain statehood. This theory is a vestige of the nineteenth 
century idea of the European states that they had the right to determine which new states 
would be admitted to or be excluded from the family of nations. See ANTONIO CASSESE, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (2d ed. 2005). 
 55 See generally MARTHA J. PETERSON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS: LEGAL 
DOCTRINE AND STATE PRACTICE, 1815-995 (1997). 
 56 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 
L.N.T.S. 19. 
 57 Id. at art. 6. 
 58 Opinion No. 1, Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Comm’n, 92 I.L.R. 162, 163 
(Nov. 29, 1991); Opinion No. 8, Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Comm’n, 92 I.L.R. 
199, 201 (July 4, 1992); Opinion No. 10, Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Comm’n, 
92 I.L.R. 206, 208 (July 4, 1992). The advocates of this declaratory theory argue that 
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somewhat unlikely that the ICJ would consider the view of the Commission, 
as it does not too often refer to the decisions of other international courts or 
tribunals which could be driven by an awareness of the Court’s pre-eminent 
status as the World Court.59 However, even by the more restrictive of the two 
theories of state recognition, the constitutive theory, the fact that as many as 
140 states formally recognized Palestine as a state by August 201860 could be 
indicative of its statehood. Having said that, the limitation to this approach of 
ascertaining Palestine’s statehood could be the myriad of uncertainties about 
the territory of Palestine and also the competing claims of governance be-
tween Fatah and Hamas. 
One point apparent from the Court’s decision in the Construction of a Wall 
Advisory Opinion of 2004 (Construction of a Wall) is that, at least until that 
point, the Court did not consider Palestine as a state.61 This would be clearly 
evident from the following observation: 
The Court considers that it has a duty to draw the attention of 
the General Assembly, to which the present Opinion is ad-
dressed, to the need for these efforts [the Roadmap and other 
Security Council resolutions] to be encouraged with a view to 
achieving as soon as possible, on the basis of international law, 
a negotiated solution to the outstanding problems and the es-
tablishment of a Palestinian State, existing side by side with 
Israel and its other neighbours, with peace and security for all 
in the region.62 [Emphasis added] 
By drawing the attention of the U.N. General Assembly for the establish-
ment of the State of Palestine, clearly, the Court expressed the view that at 
that point in time, Palestine lacked statehood. This is also interesting to note 
 
recognition is nothing but a formal declaration of an already existing fact. Therefore, recog-
nition is not a precondition of a state’s statehood, instead just a formal declaration of it. 
The newly emerged states in the twentieth century tend to support this theory. 
 59 However, the relative reticence is not any strict rule as the ICJ, in some cases, does 
refer to the precedents of other courts and tribunals. See, e.g., Ahmadou Sadio Diallo 
(Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Merits, 2010 I.C.J. 639, ¶ 66 (Nov. 30) (“Although the 
Court is in no way obligated . . . to model its own interpretation . . . on that of the Commit-
tee, it believes that it should ascribe great weight to the interpretation adopted by this in-
dependent body . . . to achieve the necessary clarity and the essential consistency of inter-
national law . . .”). 
 60 Colombia Recognises Palestine as Independent State, TRT WORLD (Aug. 9, 2018), ht 
tp://www.trtworld.com/americas/colombia-recognises-palestine-as-independent-state-194 
63. 
 61 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 162 (July 9). 
 62 Id. 
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that in declaring the construction of walls in occupied territories illegal, the 
Court did not ask Israel to compensate Palestine, but rather the persons af-
fected.63 This is a departure from the Chorzow Factory formula where a state 
in breach of an international obligation was to compensate the state to whom 
the obligation was owed.64 This is apparent as the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice (PCIJ) stated in Chorzow Factory that “the Polish Govern-
ment is under an obligation to pay, as reparation to the German Government 
[not directly to the companies suffering loss], a compensation corresponding 
to the damage sustained by the said Companies.”65 Thus, the following obser-
vation of the ICJ would also reinforce that it did not consider Palestine as a 
state at the time of delivering its opinion: 
Israel is accordingly under an obligation to return the land, or-
chards, olive groves and other immovable property seized 
from any natural or legal person for purposes of construction 
of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In the event 
that such restitution should prove to be materially impossible, 
Israel has an obligation to compensate the persons in question 
for the damage suffered. The Court considers that Israel also 
has an obligation to compensate, in accordance with the appli-
cable rules of international law, all natural or legal persons 
having suffered any form of material damage as a result of the 
wall’s construction.66  
However, it may be argued that the difference between the Construction 
of a Wall and the Chorzow Factory is due to the fact that the former is an 
advisory opinion and the latter is a judgment in a case filed by Germany seek-
ing remedy against Poland seeking remedy.67 In other words, in the Construc-
tion of a Wall, Palestine was not a party to the case, and hence, the ICJ did not 
ask Israel to compensate Palestine.68 Again, the practice of the ICJ followed 
in the Construction of a Wall connotes that the ICJ viewed Palestine as an 
unusual case.69 Article 66 of the ICJ Statute allows only states and interna-
tional organizations to make submissions before the Court during advisory 
 
 63 Id. at ¶¶ 149-153. 
 64 Factory at Chorzow, Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 27, at 48 (Sept. 13) [here-
inafter Chorzow Factory]. 
 65 Id. at 63. 
 66 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory, 2004 I.C.J. at ¶ 153 (emphasis added). 
 67 Id. at ¶136; Chorzow Factory, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 27. 
 68 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory, 2004 I.C.J. 136. 
 69 See infra notes 70-71 and the accompanying text. 
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opinion proceedings.70 Despite that, the Court allowed Palestine to make sub-
missions on a footing like the other parties on the basis of Palestine’s observer 
status in the U.N. and it being a co-sponsor of the draft resolution seeking 
advisory opinion in the case.71 In doing this, the ICJ took a leap beyond the 
text of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, because none of the 
resolutions deals with the locus standi of Palestine before the Court. Since 
Palestine could in no way be an international organization, it may be said that 
the Court considered that Palestine was competent to make submissions like 
a state. 
It is true that there is a gulf of difference between making a submission 
before the Court in the course of its advisory opinion hearings and making a 
claim against another state in its contentious jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the ad-
visory opinion approach may be an avenue for the ICJ to find jurisdiction 
without pronouncing anything definitive on the statehood of Palestine. Or 
even if the Court concludes that Palestine is not yet a state, by taking this 
relaxed procedural approach, the Court may assume jurisdiction. However, 
given the substantial difference between making a claim as a party in a con-
tentious case before the ICJ and making submissions before the Court in the 
course of an advisory opinion, the court taking this path seems rather unlikely. 
And the clear language of Article 34 of the Statute makes it all the more dif-
ficult to hold that any entity other than a state may invoke the contentious 
jurisdiction of the ICJ.72 
Assuming, arguendo, that Palestine is a state or competent to file a claim 
before the Court like states, the next issue for Palestine is whether it can file 
a case before the ICJ as a non-member of United Nations. Unlike the prior 
issue, this seems to be an easier question. The Palestinian Government in-
voked Article 35(2) of the Statute of ICJ which provides that “[t]he conditions 
under which the Court shall be open to other states [not parties to the Statute] 
shall, subject to the special provisions contained in treaties in force, be laid 
down by the Security Council.”73 The Security Council Resolution 9 of 15 
October 1946 also provides for the conditions of admissibility of claims by 
states which are not parties to the ICJ Statute.74 Thus, if the ICJ decides that 
Palestine is a state for the purposes of its Statute, then Palestine seems to have 
the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the ICJ. In this case, the Court may find 
 
 70 ICJ Statute art. 66. 
 71 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory, Request for Advisory Opinion, 2003 I.C.J. 428, ¶ 2 (Dec. 19). 
 72 ICJ Statute art. 34. 
 73 Id. at art. 35(2). See States Not Parties to the Statute to Which the Court May Be Open, 
INT’L CT. JUST., https://www.icj-cij.org/en/states-not-parties (last visited Sept. 16, 2019). 
 74 S.C. Res. 9, ¶ 1 (Oct. 15, 1946). 
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its jurisdiction under Article 1 of the OP to which both Palestine and the U.S. 
happen to be contracting parties.75 
As per Article 93(2) of the U.N. Charter, states which are not members of 
the UN may become parties to the ICJ Statute on conditions to be determined 
by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.76 
In the past, states like Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and San Marino used this 
category before joining the United Nations.77 As already discussed, consider-
ing Palestine as an observer state and co-sponsor of the Draft Resolution re-
questing the Advisory Opinion in Construction of a Wall, the ICJ allowed it 
to submit a written statement and to participate in the oral proceedings before 
it,78 which may provide a sort of a footing for Palestine to submit its case be-
fore the ICJ through this avenue. 
V.  SETTLING THE CASE WITHOUT DEALING WITH THE QUESTION OF 
PALESTINE’S STATEHOOD SUBSTANTIVELY 
Another way of dealing with the case without dealing with the question of 
Palestine’s statehood as a substantive question of international law could be 
that the ICJ may apply a limited procedural test of statehood by resorting to 
Article 81 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).79 Article 
81 states that the VCLT is open to “signature by all States Members of the 
United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies.”80 Since Palestine joined 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), a specialized agency of the United Nations on 23 November 2011 
as a member state, it can be argued that it is a state fulfilling the procedural 
threshold of bringing a claim before the ICJ.81 If this happens, the ICJ may 
decide on the merits of the case by avoiding the thorny question of Palestine’s 
statehood as a matter of general international law. 
However, some international legal agreements are already open to entities 
which are not states, for example, the WTO agreements, which include Hong 
 
 75 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the 
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, supra note 13, at art. 1. 
 76 U.N. Charter art. 93(2). 
 77 Rosalyn Cohen, The Concept of Statehood in United Nations Practice, 109 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1127, 1163 (1961). 
 78 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory, Request for Advisory Opinion, 2003 I.C.J. 428, ¶ 2 (Dec. 19). 
 79 Jude Vidmar, Palestine v United States: Why the ICJ Does Not Need to Decide 
Whether Palestine is a State, EJIL: TALK (Nov. 22, 2018), http://www.ejiltalk.org/palestine-
v-united-states-why-the-icj-does-not-need-to-decide-whether-palestine-is-a-state/. 
 80 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatises art. 81, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. 
 81 Vidmar, supra note 79. 
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Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong SAR) or Macao as mem-
bers.82 Although this allows Hong Kong SAR or Macao to be parties to the 
WTO treaties and WTO dispute settlement body, it does not mean that the 
treaties allow them to be parties before the ICJ. Again, the membership crite-
ria of UNESCO and ICJ Statute are different. Article II: 2 of the UNESCO 
Constitution states that:  
Subject to the conditions of the Agreement between this Or-
ganization and the United Nations Organization… states not 
members of the United Nations Organization may be admitted 
to membership of the Organization, upon recommendation of 
the Executive Board, by a two-thirds majority vote of the Gen-
eral Conference.83  
This would imply that the UNESCO Convention takes a more relaxed ap-
proach along the line of VCLT’s wider embrace regarding statehood as a con-
dition for membership. On the other hand, the membership criteria of the ICJ 
Statute are that a state would either have to be a member of the U.N. or be 
especially eligible to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 35(2), 
discussed above.84 Hence, it seems unlikely that the ICJ would hold that Pal-
estine’s membership of UNESCO suffices the procedural threshold of being 
a state for invoking its jurisdiction in a contentious case. 
Support for this line of argument that Palestine may fulfill the procedural 
threshold of invoking ICJ’s contentious jurisdiction comes from the ICC Pros-
ecutor’s decision of January 2015 to open the preliminary examination in re-
gard to Palestine’s status observer member state of the United Nations.85 The 
official statement explained: 
For the Office, the focus of the inquiry into Palestine’s ability 
to accede to the Rome Statute has consistently been the ques-
tion of Palestine’s status in the UN, given the UNSG’s role as 
treaty depositary of the Statute. The UNGA Resolution 67/19 
is therefore determinative of Palestine’s ability to accede to the 
 
 82 Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE 
ORG. (June 20, 2019), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. 
 83 Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
art. II, ¶ 2, Nov. 16, 1945, 4 U.N.T.S. 275. 
 84 See supra notes 73-78 and the accompanying text. 
 85 Alina Miron, Palestine’s Application the ICJ, Neither Groundless Nor Hopeless. A 
Reply to Marko Milanovic, EJIL: TALK (Oct. 8, 2018), www.ejiltalk.org/palestines-appli-
cation-the-icj-neither-groundless-nor-hopeless-a-reply-to-marko-milanovic/. 
2019] THE CASE OF PALESTINE AGAINST THE USA AT THE ICJ 15 
 
 
Statute pursuant to article 125, and equally, its ability to lodge 
an article 12(3) declaration.86 
However, regard should be had to the wording of article 12(3) of the Stat-
ute of the ICC, which states: “If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party 
to this Statute is required . . . that State may, by declaration lodged with the 
Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the 
crime in question.”87 When we compare this pronouncement in the ICC Stat-
ute with the wording in Article 34(1) that “[o]nly states may be parties in cases 
before the Court,”88 the contrasting approach seems to be evident. Whereas 
Article 34 emphasizes the fact of statehood of a party as a prerequisite for 
invoking the contentious jurisdiction, Article 12(3) simply states that a non-
party state may accept the jurisdiction of ICC.89 Article 12(3) relates to mat-
ters within “[t]he State on the territory of which the conduct in question oc-
curred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State 
of registration of that vessel or aircraft;” or “[t]he State of which the person 
accused of the crime is a national.”90 That is to say, Article 12(3) of the Statute 
of the ICC relates to matters within the territories of the state that accepts the 
jurisdiction, whereas Article 34 of the ICJ Statute does not necessarily have 
any such territorial limitation.91 Thus, on the balance, it remains doubtful as 
to what extent the ICJ may or should take the identical approach of the ICC. 
However, even if in this case, there is a difficulty in treating Palestine as a 
state qualified to invoke the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. From a 
broader policy point of view, there is a considerable policy reason to interpret 
the term ‘state’ more liberally. This has been explained eloquently by Cohen: 
A claim to become a party to the Statute of the Court is a claim 
to limited participation. A fortiori, this is true of a claim to ap-
pear before the Court on a single occasion. The undoubted de-
sirability of having as many states as possible subject to the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court and, reciprocally, with 
access to the Court, together with the fact that the claim is of a 
limited nature, provide the expectation that in this context the 
 
 86 Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, The Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court, Fatou Bensouda, Opens a Preliminary Examination of the Situation in Palestine, 
(Jan. 16, 2015) (emphasis added). 
 87 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12 ¶ 3, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. 
 88 ICJ Statute art. 34, ¶ 1. 
 89 Compare ICJ Statute art. 34, ¶ 1, with Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court art. 12, ¶ 3. 
 90 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12 ¶ 3. 
 91 Id.; ICJ Statute, art. 34. 
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term “state” will be interpreted liberally, that is, will bear a 
slightly less distinct  relationship to the formal legal criteria of 
statehood.92 
While there may be some policy reasons, from a point of view interested 
in promoting greater recourse to the settlement of disputes through legal 
means, in this particular case it is uncertain whether the Court takes a narrow 
textual approach or a liberal approach. 
VI. THE SHIFTING OF THE U.S. EMBASSY AND VCDR 
Palestine acceded to the OP on March 22, 2018.93 On May 1, 2018, the 
United States communicated to the Depository of the U.N. that it considers 
that the “‘State of Palestine’ is not qualified to accede to the Optional Proto-
col” and hence, it would “not consider itself to be in a treaty relationship with 
the ‘State of Palestine’ under the Optional Protocol.”94 On this particular 
point, it seems that neither VCLT nor customary international law provides 
any direct guidance as to the consequences of the USA’s assertion. Only this 
far may be said with some degree of conviction that the USA’s declaration 
cannot, ipso facto, have any implication for Palestine’s rights and obligations 
in relation to other parties to the VCDR. To hold otherwise would be tanta-
mount to saying that a treaty party can unilaterally determine the legal status 
of accession of another party which is clearly untenable. That would give a 
treaty party effectively veto power over a majority of other treaty parties with-
out whose consent the objected state could not have acceded to the treaty in 
the first place. 
However, to the extent that the United States wants to deny its treaty rela-
tionship with Palestine, the answer seems to be that the United States may do 
so at its will. The basis of treaty rights and obligations is the consent of the 
parties.95 Hence, when a treaty party unequivocally denounces its treaty rela-
tionship with another treaty party, it is difficult to see how the two parties can 
owe any treaty obligations to each other. Possibly, the only question about the 
 
 92 Cohen, supra note 77, at 1163. 
 93 U.N. Secretary-General, Optional  Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes: State of Palestine: Acces-
sion (Mar. 23, 2018). 
 94 U.N. Secretary-General, Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations, Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes: United States of America: 
Communication, (May 1, 2018), available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/20 
18/CN.228.2018-Eng.pdf. 
 95 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatises, supra note 80, at 332 (Preamble, 
stating “[t]he States Parties to the present Convention . . . that the principles of free consent 
and of good faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule are universally recognized.”). 
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United States’ position on this could be that since the United States felt that it 
was in no treaty relation to Palestine, why, after a short period of Palestine 
filing its case at the ICJ, the United States withdrew from the OP. The ra-
tionale behind this is unclear, perhaps this far can be said that the United States 
simply wanted to stress its lack of interest in participating in the case. Thus, it 
may pose a jurisdictional hurdle for Palestine and the case may end here. Had 
the United States accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ under the 
Optional Clause, i.e., Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute,96 Palestine could poten-
tially (though perhaps only theoretically) have another opening to overcome 
the jurisdictional barrier. 
Generally, states establish their diplomatic missions in the capital city or 
sometimes other town which is the seat of government of the receiving state, 
and they tend to follow that government’s seat when it moves either perma-
nently or provisionally.97 However, in exceptional cases, this common prac-
tice has not been followed, e.g. in Saudi Arabia, the Foreign Office of the 
receiving state was in Jeddah, where foreign missions were required to be lo-
cated, not in Riyadh, the actual seat of the government.98 This is understand-
able because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be the natural point of 
contact for the embassy. In case of Israel, most diplomatic missions have re-
mained in Tel Aviv because a shift to Jerusalem would indicate the acceptance 
of Israel’s establishment there of its seat of government, which most govern-
ments not been keen to do so far.99 Another notable exception is Vatican City 
which, due to its small size, cannot fit in the diplomatic missions of the various 
sending states and thus, those are located in Rome based on an agreement with 
the Government of Italy.100 However, these cases are different from that of the 
United States re-locating its embassy to Jerusalem because of “the disputed 
status of the city of Jerusalem making it arguably located beyond the territory 
of Israel.”101 
Article 12 of the VCDR, 1961 requires that “[t]he sending State may not, 
without the prior express consent of the receiving State, establish offices 
forming part of the mission in localities other than those in which the mission 
 
 96 If a state on a voluntary basis, by a unilateral declaration has communicated to the ICJ 
under 36(2) that it accepts the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory ipso facto and with-
out any special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court can be established for bringing a 
case against that state. However, in practice, this jurisdiction is also limited as states make 
declarations under terms and conditions which are solely determined by themselves. See 
Stanimir A. Alexandrov, The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Jus-
tice: How Compulsory Is It?, 5 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 29 (2006). 
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100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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itself is established.”102 However, this Article does not seem to be directly 
applicable in this case.103 In other words, Article 12 seems to apply to those 
situations “when a sending state would want to establish its mission in a lo-
cality in which the receiving state [objects to] allow such an establishment.”104 
Clearly, the United States embassy in Jerusalem has been based on an agree-
ment between the sending and receiving state, i.e. the United States and Israel. 
Another issue about VCDR is its Article 3 states that the functions of a 
diplomatic mission consist, inter alia, in: 
(a) Representing the sending State in the receiving State; (b) 
Protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending 
State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by inter-
national law … (d) Ascertaining by all lawful means condi-
tions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting 
thereon to the Government of the sending State (e) Promoting 
friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving 
State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific 
relations.105 
The words “in the receiving state” in four of the five clauses in Article 3 
may connote that the drafters of the VCDR perceived a nexus between the 
diplomatic mission and the territory of the receiving state. In this case, the 
capacity of Israel to give this consent itself is undecided due to the disputed 
status of the city of Jerusalem. But having said that, for sure, the United States’ 
relocation of its embassy to Jerusalem gives recognition to the Israeli claim 
and thus, is at odds with the extensive international recognition of Jerusalem 
as a disputed territory.106 Indeed, until President Trump’s declaration on De-
cember 6, 2017, the United States had always acknowledged that no state had 
sovereignty over Jerusalem.107 Thus, by moving its embassy to Jerusalem, by 
its own position, the United States has established its diplomatic mission in 
Israel in a territory which is under international law, not Israel’s territory. 
Thus, the special status of Jerusalem ”established as a corpus separa-
tum under a special international regime” set up by the General Assembly 
Resolution no. 181(II) of November 29, 1947 creates a moratorium until Is-
raelis and Palestinians agree.108 Therefore, the territorial situation creates erga 
 
102  Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 1, at art. 12. 
103  Islam, supra note 7. 
104  Id. 
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omnes obligations, which differ from most of the generally bilateral in nature 
VCDR obligations. Beyond the U.N. resolutions, Israel recognized the special 
status of Jerusalem when it applied for U.N. membership. Mr. Eban, the Israeli 
representative, stated: 
The question of sovereignty over the area [Jerusalem] has not 
yet been finally settled and will be settled, perhaps, at the 
fourth session of the General Assembly. It will not be for the 
Government of Israel alone to determine that issue of sover-
eignty. All we can do—and even then only if we are Members 
of the United Nations—will be to propose formally certain so-
lutions of our own.109 
It is well-established that a unilateral declaration by a state can create in-
ternational legal obligations towards other states, as established by the PCIJ 
in Eastern Greenland.110 In the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ followed its pre-
decessor’s approach and went a step further observing: 
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilat-
eral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the 
effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind 
may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention 
of the State making the declaration that it should become 
bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the dec-
laration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being 
thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct con-
sistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if 
given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though 
not made within the context of international negotiations, is 
binding.111 
Thus, it seems that Israel’s own acknowledgement about the contested sta-
tus of Jerusalem could help Palestine’s claim about the disputed status of Je-
rusalem. This would, in turn, mean that absent an authoritative declaration by 
the U.N., neither Israel nor Palestine can claim their sovereignty over Jerusa-
lem. Beyond the General Assembly Resolution and Israel’s acknowledgement 
of the special status of Jerusalem, the same was recognized by the ICJ in its 
advisory opinion in the Wall Case, as the Court categorically stated “the Court 
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is of the view that all States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal 
situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestin-
ian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem.”112 
It can be said that whether or not the United States’ declaration amounts 
to a violation of Article 41(2) of the 2001 International Law Commission’s 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts (Draft Articles)113 may well become a central substantive issue before 
the ICJ.114 This Article states that “[n]o State shall recognize as lawful a situ-
ation created by a serious breach . . . nor render aid or assistance in maintain-
ing that situation.”115 According to Article 40 of the Draft Articles, the serious 
breach would be “obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general in-
ternational law.”116 If Israel’s 1967 obtaining of control over East Jerusalem 
and the subsequent expansion of municipal boundaries is an annexation, then 
the recognition of that wrongful annexation may itself amount to a serious 
breach of international law. If this Israeli action is treated as an annexation, 
then there is a convincing basis for treating the United States’ action as incon-
sistent with Article 41(2) of the Draft Articles.117 
Another point which may lend significant force to Palestine’s case on this 
particular point is the UN Security Council Resolutions 476 and 478 of 
1980.118 Resolution 476 “[r]eiterates that all such measures which have al-
tered the geographic, demographic and historical character and status of the 
Holy City of Jerusalem are null and void and must be rescinded in compliance 
with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.”119 Resolution 478 de-
clared that Israel’s claim through a law passed by the Knesset in declaring 
Jerusalem, complete and united, as the capital of Israel violated international 
law.120 Before the adoption of Resolution 478, Chile, Ecuador, and Venezuela 
had announced their decision to withdraw their respective diplomatic missions 
from Jerusalem.121 At the time of passing Resolution 478, ten states—Bolivia, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Haiti, the Netherlands, Panama and Uruguay—had their missions in Jerusa-
lem. Between August 22 and September 9, all of these States appraised the 
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UN Secretary-General that they decided to withdraw their mission from the 
city.122 And this resolution has fostered a process of the quite consistent col-
lective international non-recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.123 
VII. THE RIGHT OF THIRD PARTY (ISRAEL) 
Another formidable barrier to the jurisdiction of the ICJ in this case could 
be the Monetary Gold principle, as propounded in the Monetary Gold Case 
decided by the ICJ in 1954.124 As a matter of jurisprudence, the core issue 
before the ICJ was whether it had the third party jurisdiction to settle a legal 
dispute between Italy and Albania over assets belonging to Italy that Albania 
expropriated.125 In 1925, Italian financiers and the Albanian monarchial gov-
ernment agreed to set up a Banking arrangement which established the Na-
tional Bank of Albania (NBA).126 As per the arrangement, the NBA would 
have the exclusive rights to issue bank notes in Albania which were to be 
backed up by gold reserves physically stored in Rome.127 Eventually, by Sep-
tember 16, 1943, the Italian government became the owner of 88.5% of the 
total share capital of NBA, which included its gold reserve in Rome.128 That 
same day, the German Nazi forces seized around 2,339 kilograms of this gold 
reserve and took it to Germany.129 After the German surrender in 1945, Part 
III of the Final Act Regarding Reparations after World War II provided that 
monetary gold would be “pooled for distribution … in proportion to [a coun-
try’s] respective losses of gold through looting or wrongful removal to Ger-
many.”130 It designated France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to 
be responsible for ensuring equitable distribution of the monetary gold.131 
An arbitration held under the Final Act decided that the gold seized from 
the vault of the NBA belonged to Albania.132 But in the meantime, the newly 
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formed government of Albania on January 13, 1945 nationalized the NBA and 
seized all its assets including the gold looted by Nazis.133 However, Albania 
did not compensate Italy for the expropriation.134 Again, the U.K. also claimed 
this gold as partial satisfaction for Albania’s refusal to pay compensation as 
per the ICJ’s judgment in Corfu Channel Case.135  Both Italy and the U.K. 
claimed compensation from Albania, but Albania’s shares in the NBA were 
not enough to satisfy both.136 A Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of 
Monetary Gold (involving France, the U.K., and the United States) decided 
that, should Italy fail to apply to the ICJ on the priority between these two 
competing claims, the gold would be given to the U.K.137 
In May 1953, Italy filed a case before the ICJ claiming priority over the 
U.K.138 Italy’s first submission was that France, the UK, and the United States 
“should deliver to Italy any share of the monetary gold that might be due to 
Albania under Part III of the Paris Act of January 14th, 1946, in partial satis-
faction for the damage caused to Italy.”139 Rather remarkably, Italy then ques-
tioned the jurisdiction of the ICJ to settle this preliminary question.140 In its 
judgment, the ICJ decided that since Albania had not consented to the juris-
diction of the Court, it could not decide a question between Albania and It-
aly.141 The ICJ reasoned that “[t]o adjudicate upon the international responsi-
bility of Albania without her consent would run counter to a well-established 
principle of international law embodied in the Court’s Statute, namely, that 
the Court can only exercise jurisdiction over a State with its consent.”142 This 
principle was followed by the ICJ in the East Timor Case.143 
However, the Monetary Gold principle may only apply if the ICJ decides 
that the judgment would involve the rights of Israel. If the relocation of the 
U.S. embassy is taken as a decision made by the U.S. administration, then the 
Monetary Gold principle may not apply in this case. Technically speaking, 
Palestine has not sought to make any claim against Israel; its intended remedy 
is sought against the United States only.144 At most, the Palestinian’s case 
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143  East Timor (Port. v Austl.), Judgment 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30). 
144  See Palestine Instituting Proceedings at 16, Decision Requested states: 
. . . By the present Application, the State of Palestine therefore requests 
the Court to declare that the relocation, to the Holy City of Jerusalem, of 
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involves an issue which entails the legality of an action involving Israel. In-
deed, the ICJ may hold that the legality of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel 
and the relocation of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem are two distinct issues. In 
other words, the violation of an international legal obligation by Israel and the 
acceptance of that violation by the United States are related but distinct issues. 
Should the ICJ take this direction, then the ICJ may decide on the case not-
withstanding the Monetary Gold principle. 
One commentator has argued somewhat along this line and suggested that 
in Palestine’s case the principle may be interpreted narrowly, and thus the ICJ 
may find jurisdiction.145 The argument goes that “the Monetary Gold principle 
is not about affecting the legal interests of the third State, but about protecting 
its rights and obligations from international adjudication without its con-
sent.”146 The support for this restrictive reading of Monetary Gold is sought 
from the following passage of the ICJ’s judgement in East Timor case that 
“[t]he Court emphasizes that it is not necessarily prevented from adjudicating 
when the judgment it is asked to give might affect the legal interests of a State 
which is not a party to the case.”147 The Court would refrain from exercising 
jurisdiction when the third state’s “rights and obligations would thus consti-
tute the very subject-matter of such a judgment made in the absence of that 
State’s consent.”148 
The Nauru Case149 may also give us some idea about the application or 
otherwise of the Monetary Gold principle. There, Nauru alleged that Australia 
unlawfully exploited its natural resources while working as the joint adminis-
tering authority (along with New Zealand and the United Kingdom) under a 
mandate of the League of Nations and then a trusteeship by the United Na-
tions.150 Australia pleaded that without determining the responsibilities of 
 
the United States Embassy in Israel is in breach of the Vienna Conven-
tion on Diplomatic Relations. 
. . . The State of Palestine further requests the Court to order the United 
States of America to withdraw the diplomatic mission from the Holy City 
of Jerusalem and to conform to the international obligations flowing from 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 
. . . In addition, the State of Palestine asks the Court to order the United 
States of America to take all necessary steps to comply with its obliga-
tions, to refrain from taking any future measures that would violate its 
obligations and to provide assurances and guarantees of non-repetition 
of its unlawful conduct. 
145  Miron, supra note 85. 
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147  East Timor, 199 I.C.J. at 104. 
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149  Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Preliminary Objections, 1992 
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New Zealand and the United Kingdom—neither of which were parties to the 
case—the Court could not decide the matter.151 The Court distinguished this 
from the Monetary Gold principle by observing that the determination of Al-
bania’s responsibility was a precondition deciding on Italy’s claims, but here 
the determination of the responsibility of the two other parties was not a pre-
requisite for determining Australia’s responsibility.152 The Court accepted that 
the finding, in this case, could have implications for other parties, but the 
Court would not have to dwell on that situation and therefore, it felt obliged 
to exercise jurisdiction.153 The Court also pointed to the text of Article 59 of 
the ICJ Statute to underscored that any finding of the Court would not bind a 
non-party to the case before it.154 
By analogy, it may be surmised that if the Court decides on the merits of 
Palestine’s claim, obviously, that would have implications for Israel, but the 
judgment would only bind the parties to the case. Hence, the Monetary Gold 
principle may not preclude the Court from exercising jurisdiction. To clarify, 
should the Court decide that the relocation of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem 
is illegal, it would only create an obligation on the United States to relocate it, 
not Israel because the relocation can be done by the U.S. alone. It is plausible 
to argue that the relocation of the U.S. embassy is a decision of the U.S.’s 
administration, and although undeniably it would have an effect on Israel, to 
determine the legality of Israel’s action is not directly at issue in this case. 
That being said, much could hinge on whether the ICJ designates Jerusalem 
as a contested territory or not. If the ICJ decides that Jerusalem is a disputed 
territory, then the Monetary Gold principle seems much easier to get around 
for the Court. 
There is an argument that since the ICJ did not refer to Monetary Gold in 
Marshall Islands Nuclear Disarmament155, then the ICJ may similarly ignore 
the principle in Palestine’s case. 156 However, too much should not be read 
from that judgment because the Court in the Marshall Islands decided that it 
did not have to decide on jurisdiction because there was an absence of dis-
pute.157 Hence, it would appear that the Court did not have to dwell on the 
Monetary Gold principle to arrive at its finding and so the judgement does not 
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155  Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms 
Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. India), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
2016 I.C.J. 255 (Oct. 5); (Marsh. Is. v. Pak.), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 2016 I.C.J. 
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  157 Nuclear Disarmament, 2016 I.C.J. at 856. 
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enlighten us as to how the Court would apply the principle in the case at hand 
here. 
VIII. THE JUSTICIABILITY OF POLITICAL QUESTIONS 
It is quite likely that though the case may be intrinsically linked with po-
litical ramifications, this would not in itself deter the Court to shy away from 
exercising jurisdiction. The jurisprudence on this point is more or less settled 
that simply because a case before the Court has political aspects linked to it, 
the Court would not deem it unable to deal with the matter, as long as the case 
poses legal questions.158 This is backed up by sound policy reasons too. States 
are political entities and it is quite common that legal disputes between states 
would involve political questions in one form or the other.159 Hence, too much 
sensitivity about political questions may render the Court virtually ineffectual. 
The law on this point can be found in the following words in the Kosovo Opin-
ion: 
[T]he Court has repeatedly stated that the fact that a question 
has political aspects does not suffice to deprive it of its char-
acter as a legal question . . . . Whatever its political aspects, the 
Court cannot refuse to respond to the legal elements of a ques-
tion which invites it to discharge an essentially judicial task, 
namely, in the present case, an assessment of an act by refer-
ence to international law. The Court has also made clear that, 
in determining the jurisdictional issue of whether it is con-
fronted with a legal question, it is not concerned with the po-
litical nature of the motives which may have inspired the re-
quest or the political implications which its opinion might 
have.160 
A similar finding was made in the Construction of a Wall when the ICJ 
stated that “the circumstance that others may evaluate and interpret these facts 
in a subjective or political manner can be no argument for a court of law to 
abdicate its judicial task.”161 Thus, as long as the Court finds that there is a 
legal dispute, the political sensitivity alone would not bar the Court from pro-
ceeding with the case. The same principle has been upheld in the context of 
 
  158 See infra note 160 and the accompanying text. 
  159 Andrew Coleman, The International Court of Justice and Highly Political Matters, 14 
MEL. J. INT’L L. 29, 32 (2003). 
  160 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 27 (July 22). 
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contentious cases too. In Nicaragua, when the United States challenged the 
jurisdiction of the Court arguing that the Case involved political questions, 
the Court, reiterating its finding in United States Diplomatic and Consular 
Staff in Tehran, rejected the United States’ argument and observed, “[N]ever 
has the view been put forward before that, because a legal dispute submitted 
to the Court is only one aspect of a political dispute, the Court should decline 
to resolve for the parties the legal questions at issue between them.”162 
The jurisprudence on this is also consistently applied in Border and Trans-
border Armed Actions where the Court observed: 
[T]he Court is aware that political aspects may be present in 
any legal dispute brought before it. The Court, as a judicial 
organ, is however only concerned to establish, first, that the 
dispute before it is a legal dispute, in the sense of a dispute 
capable of being settled by the application of principles and 
rules of international law, and secondly, that the Court has ju-
risdiction to deal with it, and that that jurisdiction is not fet-
tered by any circumstance rendering the application inadmis-
sible. The purpose of recourse to the Court is the peaceful 
settlement of such disputes; the Court’s judgment is a legal 
pronouncement, and it cannot concern itself with the political 
motivation which may lead a State at a particular time, or in 
particular circumstances, to choose judicial settlement.163 
IX. CONCLUSION 
How the ICJ would handle the case is a matter of conjecture at this stage. 
While some issues such as the justiciability of political questions are relatively 
settled jurisprudence, some others such as the statehood of Palestine or its 
locus standi are more uncertain. However, some points may be made with 
some degree of certainty. Should the Court find that it has jurisdiction in this 
case and proceeds to hear the case on its merits, that in itself may lead to legal 
answers to some questions which may then have some degree of impact on 
resuscitating the peace process in the Middle East. From a realpolitik point of 
view, if the ICJ only decides that Palestine is a state and then because of the 
Monetary Gold principle or some other reason goes on to hold that it lacks 
jurisdiction to proceed to the merits, that could mean the end of the case, but 
 
 162 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Juris-
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still a significant political status boost for Palestine. However, if the Court 
takes up the highly debated issue of Palestinian statehood, it is unlikely that it 
would shy away from proceeding with a more jurisprudential issue such as 
the Monetary Gold principle. 
Without the advantage of a crystal ball or hindsight, it may be said that 
should the ICJ decide that it has jurisdiction to proceed to hear the case on 
merit (by pronouncing on the statehood of Palestine or not), the Monetary 
Gold principle or the violation of VCDR as such may not prove to be an in-
surmountable barrier for giving its judgement on the merits of the case. Addi-
tionally, because of the complex questions this case poses, any judgment by 
the Court beyond the preliminary issue of admissibility of the case would 
likely be read and re-read by readers of international law for quite some time. 
It is somewhat paradoxical that while on merit Palestine seems to have a rather 
good case, on a jurisdictional level, it has to surmount many challenges which 
may stand in the way of it going that far. This is perhaps more a reflection of 
the consent-centric nature of international law than anything to do with this 
case per se. 
 
